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We introduce a new and conceptually simple interpretation of quantum mechanics based on re-
duced density matrices of sub-systems from which the standard Copenhagen interpretation emerges
as an effective description of macroscopically large systems. Wave function collapse is seen to be a
useful but fundamentally unnecessary piece of prudent book keeping which is only valid for macro-
systems. The new interpretation lies in a class of modal interpretations in that it applies to quantum
systems that interact with a much larger environment. However, we show that it does not suffer
from the problems that have plagued similar modal interpretations like macroscopic superpositions
and rapid flipping between macroscopically distinct states. We describe how the interpretation fits
neatly together with fully quantum formulations of statistical mechanics and that a measurement
process can be viewed as a process of ergodicity breaking analogous to a phase transition. The
key feature of the new interpretation is that joint probabilities for the ergodic subsets of states
of disjoint macro-systems only arise as emergent quantities. Finally we give an account of the
EPR-Bohm thought experiment and show that the interpretation implies the violation of the Bell
inequality characteristic of quantum mechanics but in a way that is rather novel. The final con-
clusion is that the Copenhagen interpretation gives a completely satisfactory phenomenology of
macro-systems interacting with micro-systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The central mystery of quantum mechanics is present
even in the simplest measurement on a qubit. Solving the
Schro¨dinger equation for a suitable Hamiltonian gives an
evolution of the form(
c+|z+〉+ c−|z−〉
)⊗ |A0〉
−→ c+|z+〉 ⊗ |A+〉+ c−|z−〉 ⊗ |A−〉 ,
(1)
where the two states |A±〉 are macroscopically distinct
states of the measuring device. But how can this be
consistent with the fact that when any experiment of
this type is performed a definite outcome occurs either
|A+〉 or |A−〉? The Copenhagen interpretation1 solves
the problem by “collapsing the wave function,” i.e. choos-
ing only one of the distinct terms on the right-hand side
with probabilities |c±|2, respectively, on the grounds that
the measuring device is macroscopic. The universal suc-
cess of applying the rule disguises the fact that it is re-
ally only a rule of thumb: when is a system sufficiently
macroscopic that it qualifies for collapse? This arbitrary
separation of systems into microscopic and macroscopic
is the famous Heisenberg cut.
We can measure how macroscopically distinct the two
states of the measuring device |A±〉 are by estimating
their inner product. Let us suppose the measuring de-
vice has a macroscopically large number of microscopic
∗ t.hollowood@swansea.ac.uk
1 The Copenhagen interpretation is not really a completely settled
set of ideas. We are using the term to stand for the way that
most working physicists successfully use quantum mechanics in
practice without having to even think about foundational issues.
degrees-of-freedom N . States are macroscopically dis-
tinct if all the microscopic degrees-of-freedom are sepa-
rated by a macroscopic scale L. If ℓ is a characteristic
microscopic length scale in the system and assuming, say,
Gaussian wave functions for the microscopical degrees-
of-freedom spread over the scale ℓ, the matrix elements
between macroscopically distinct states is roughly
∆ ≡
∣∣〈A+|A−〉∣∣ ∼ exp [−NL2/ℓ2] . (2)
Just to get a feel for the numbers, suppose N ∼ 1020,
ℓ ∼ 10−10m (atomic size) and L ∼ 10−4m, giving
∆ ∼ e−10
32
In the following we will use ∆ to denote a generic scale
characterising the inner products of macroscopically dis-
tinct states. The estimate above is intended as a guide
and the fact that this generic scale is so small will play
an important role in this work.
There is an interesting analogue of the measurement
problem in classical statistical mechanics. Consider an
Ising ferromagnet above its Curie temperature. In a typ-
ical configuration, the spins point randomly up or down
and there is no net magnetization. In the standard in-
terpretation of classical statistical mechanics, the ensem-
ble average captures a time average of the dynamics of
the underlying microscopic state of the system. This is
a statement of ergodicity: over time, interactions ensure
that the microscopic state explores all the available states
with a probability given by the usual Boltzmann factor.
Now, if the temperature is reduced below the Curie tem-
perature, there is a phase transition and the magnet finds
itself in an ordered state where the spins tend to line up
in the same direction, either up or down, and the system
develops a net magnetization. At a microscopic level, er-
godicity is broken and for a given initial micro-state the
2system effectively only explores half of the overall ensem-
ble over time and it is each of these sub-ensembles that
has a net magnetization.
This picture of ergodicity breaking provides a possible
template for solving the quantum measurement problem.
The key feature that allows for its breaking in classical
statistical mechanics is that the state of the system has
two dual aspects: the ensemble and the micro-state. Of
course, the fact that we deal with ensembles is because
we, as macroscopic observers, are ignorant as to the ex-
act micro-state at any particular time. When the system
is in equilibrium, microscopic interactions in the system
ensure that the micro-state explores the set of available
states ergodically and a suitably coarse-grained time av-
erage is equal to the ensemble average. However, when
the magnet undergoes the phase transition to the low
temperature phase, the system becomes highly sensitive
to which of the sub-ensembles the micro-state lies in. Af-
ter the transition, ergodicity is broken and the micro-
state only explores a sub-ensemble over time and so the
time average is captured by the sub-ensemble. What is
crucial for this mechanism is that underlying the ensem-
ble is the existence of a real micro-state, even though this
is hidden from the macroscopic point-of-view.
In order to carry this over into the quantum mechani-
cal measurement problem, we need the analogues of the
ensemble and the micro-state or what is called an “epis-
temic state” and an “ontic state”.2
quantum mech. statistical mech.
epistemic state ! ensemble
ontic state ! micro-state
If we had such a dual aspect, or different modalities , of
the quantum state then we would have the possibility
of applying an argument that involves the breaking of
ergodicity to the measurement problem.
We do not expect that the macroscopic measuring de-
vice A will be in a pure quantum state, rather, it will
be described by a reduced density matrix ρˆA as a con-
sequence of its interaction with its environment. This
density matrix is the epistemic state, the analogue of
the ensemble in classical statistical mechanics. However,
quantum mechanics in the standard formulation offers no
analogue of an ontic state. In fact any attempt to pro-
vide an additional specification of the quantum state is
tantamount to the introduction of hidden variables and,
as shown by Bell [42], generally leads to predictions that
are not consistent with standard quantum mechanics and
experiments. So the conclusion is that classical statis-
tic mechanics cannot provide a perfect analogue of what
happens in a quantum measurement unless there is some
way to introduce addition information into the quantum
state, the ontic information, but in a way that would
2 The latter were called “internal states” in [1] after [32, 33].
be consistent with the usual predictions of quantum me-
chanics including the violation of Bell’s theorem. A clue
to how this could be done, is provided by a class of modal
interpretations of quantum mechanics. In some of these
interpretations, a system, being a sub-system of a larger
system, is described by a reduced density matrix, the
epistemic state. But as well as having a density matrix,
the system also carries an ontic state in the form of one of
the eigenvector of the reduced density matrix. These are
the two modalities of the quantum state. Once we allow
A
E
S : |Ψ〉
ρˆA = TrE |Ψ〉〈Ψ| =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|
FIG. 1. A sub-systemA of a large quantum system S = A+E.
The quantum state of A is described by the reduced density
matrix ρˆA. In the new interpretation the ontic state of A at
a given time corresponds to one of the eigenvectors of ρˆA.
the system to have its own ontic state then this opens
up the possibility to solve the measurement problem by
using an ergodicity argument along the lines of classical
statistical mechanics.3 The question that we address in
this paper is whether a complete and consistent interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics can be constructed along
these lines. Our claim—building on [1]—is that there ex-
ists a conceptually simple interpretation that can fill the
ugly gap in the Copenhagen interpretation between uni-
tary time evolution of states and the collapse of the wave
function by having these features apply to the two dif-
ferent modes of the quantum state. At the same time it
appear to evade the consequences of Bell’s theorem and
its generalizations to be fully consistent with the usual
predictions of quantum mechanics. We call this new in-
terpretation the emergent Copenhagen interpretation for
reasons that will themselves emerge. It lies firmly in the
class of modal interpretations [2–10]4 but is rather dif-
ferent in some fundamental ways that ensure it does not
suffer from the problems that plague other modal inter-
pretations.
The new interpretation, like other modal interpreta-
tions, works hand-in-hand with the phenomenon of deco-
herence in quantum systems [16–22] in order to describe a
3 The fact that ergodicity breaking should play some role in
the measurement problem crystalized in discussions with Jacob
Barandes.
4 The book by Vermaas [11] gives an eloquent account of the class
of modal interpretations, both their successes and problems, as
well as having a full list of references.
3satisfactory phenomenology of macroscopic systems and
is closely allied to the modern understanding of statisti-
cal mechanics as it arises from the quantum mechanics of
systems interacting with large environments or baths [23–
30]. Classical behaviour, the Born rule and wave function
collapse are not put in by hand but are seen to emerge as
an approximate phenomenology of systems with a macro-
scopic number of degrees-of-freedom. Heisenberg’s cut is
replaced by a continuous spectrum of “classicality”. Fi-
nally, the new interpretation leads to a solution of the
measurement problem via the mechanism of ergodicity
breaking.
The paper is organised as follows. In section II we in-
troduce the new interpretation by defining ontic states
in section IIA. In section II B, we discuss disjoint sub-
systems and how their ontic states can relate to the ontic
states of their union. In section II C, we discuss sub-
systems in general and the extent to which quantum de-
scriptions of a system are to be thought of as effective
theories with an in-build ultra-violet cut off. Section
IID then considers the dynamics of ontic states. This
takes the form of a stochastic process which must sat-
isfy a number of conditions. Most importantly, as we
discuss in section II E, it must be coarse-grained at the
scale of the ultra-violet cut off in the temporal domain to
avoid problems of other modal interpretations. Section
III discusses how a recognisable classical ontology can
emerge for macro-systems. This involves a discussion of
how a classical ontology involves a patching together of
ontic states of a number of macro-systems embedded in
a larger environment. We show that it is meaningful to
define joint probabilities for disjoint systems but only in
an emergent sense. Section III B explains how the new
interpretation is related to modern formulations of sta-
tistical mechanics built on quantum mechanics. Section
IV is devoted to a discussion of measurement. We first
show in section IVA how a simple model without an
environment can account for some features of measure-
ment but also has a number of problems. In section IVB,
these problems are all resolved in a more realistic model
that includes the environment as well as a measuring de-
vice that is not 100% efficient. In section V we discuss
the classical experiment of Bohm based on the original
thought experiment of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen and
show the new interpretation gives a description that re-
produces that of Copenhagen quantum mechanics but
without the need to collapse the wave function. Finally,
in section VI, we draw some conclusions.
II. THE EMERGENT COPENHAGEN
INTERPRETATION
A. Ontic States
A key feature of the new interpretation, as in some
other modal interpretations, is the focus on sub-systems
of larger systems A ⊂ S: see figure 1. For simplicity,
we assume that S is large enough so that its quantum
dynamics is to an excellent approximation unitary. In
most cases, we can assume that the state of S is pure
|Ψ(t)〉; indeed, much of the what we say will be indepen-
dent of the exact state of S whether mixed or pure.5 For
each sub-system, A ⊂ S for which the Hilbert space of S
factorizes as HS = HA ⊗ HE , we can define a reduced
density matrix by tracing over the Hilbert space of the
complement E:
ρˆA(t) = TrE |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)| . (3)
It is a theorem that the reduced density ρˆA(t) has a dis-
crete spectrum:
ρˆA(t)|ψi(t)〉 = pi(t)|ψi(t)〉 , (4)
where the {pi(t)} are a set of real numbers with 0 ≤
pi(t) ≤ 1 and
∑
i pi(t) = 1. The reduced density matrix
ρˆA is the epistemic state of A.
The ontic state: at a particular instant of time, the
new interpretation asserts that A is actually in one
of the eigenstates |ψi(t)〉. The state that is actually
realised is called the ontic state.
This property assignment is done at an instant of time t
and therefore a degeneracy in the {pi(t)} is not realistic.
However, dealing with problems that arise from degen-
eracies, or more realistically near-degeneracies, as time
evolves is key to building a successful modal interpreta-
tion. Note, also that the time-dependence of the ontic
state |ψi(t)〉 refers to the time at which the decomposi-
tion (4) is made and it is important that these states do
not generally solve the Schro¨dinger equation.6
Unlike other modal interpretations, we do not directly
interpret pi(t) as the probability that A is in the ontic
state |ψi(t)〉, although this will emerge in certain situa-
tions. In fact, the more fundamental probabilities in the
new interpretation are conditional probabilities pi|j(t, t0)
that, given the system was in the ontic state |ψj(t0)〉 at an
earlier time t0 < t, the system is in the ontic state |ψi(t)〉
at time t. It is a hypothesis that these conditional prob-
ability are related to the single-time probabilities pi(t)
via
pi(t) =
∑
j
pi|j(t, t0)pj(t0) (5)
Given this, there are two ways that the pi(t) can be in-
terpreted as single-time probabilities:
5 Note that the mixed states that we have are all “improper mix-
tures” and we do not need the concept of a “proper mixture”.
6 In fact, since A is generally interacting with E there is no concept
of a Schro¨dinger equation applying within the sub-system A.
4Initial condition: the key equation (5) shows that is an
unambiguous way to define the single-time proba-
bilities pi(t) via an initial condition. If at t0 the
state of S is a tensor product state |ψ0(t0)〉 ⊗
|φ0(t0)〉, then the ontic state at t0 is uniquely
|ψ0(t0)〉. In that case, pi(t) = pi|0(t, t0) is the prob-
ability that the ontic state is |ψi(t)〉 at time t > t0.
Equilibrium: we will see, in section III B, that there is
another definition that is valid when A is a macro-
system in equilibrium with its environment E so
that ρˆA(t) is only slowly varying. In this case,
for a characteristic time scale τ , pi|j(t, t0), with
t = t0 + τ , becomes independent of j, the initial
state. In that case, pi(t) = pi|j(t, t0) (approxi-
mately time-independent) is the probability of find-
ing the system in the ontic state |ψi(t)〉, indepen-
dent of the initial state |ψj(t0)〉.
One might imagine that the assignment of a particular
ontic state is tantamount to specifying a kind of hidden
variable. As we will see this is potentially misleading
because the behaviour of ontic states is not at all like
standard hidden variables. In particular, the ontic states
of A are not global property assignments and the recog-
nition that they are only intrinsic properties from the
perspective of A in relation to the rest of the total sys-
tem is known in the literature on modal interpretations
as relationalism or perspectivalism [12–15]. We want to
emphasize that this is not really a philosophical stance
but is simply acknowledging what it means to perform
a trace that involves summing over states in a disjoint
sub-system to A.
There is an important additional detail to mention
here. Since the total system A + E is in a pure state
|Ψ〉, then assuming dA ≤ dE , where dA = dimHA, etc.,
because the environment E is typically much bigger than
the sub-system of interest A, each ontic states of A, say
|ψi〉, is precisely correlated with a particular ontic state
of E, which we call the mirror ontic state and denote
|ψ˜i〉. This follows because ρˆA and ρˆE have the same
non-vanishing spectrum and one way to exhibit the cor-
relation is via the Schmidt decomposition of |Ψ〉:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
√
pi|ψi〉 ⊗ |ψ˜i〉 . (6)
The states |ψi〉 ⊗ |ψ˜i〉 are a set of dA orthogonal vectors
in the dAdE dimensional Hilbert space of A+ E. So the
property assignment of |ψi〉 is always precisely correlated
with the mirror assignment of |ψ˜i〉 to its complement. We
will see in section IID that the mirror ontic states play
an important role in the dynamics of ontic states.
Finally, we should point out that ontic states are ir-
reducible in the sense that there is no further notion of
probability on top of their inherent probability. In this
regard, we do not assume a priori the Born rule which
we will have to ultimately derive from the behaviour of
ontic states in realistic situations.
B. Disjoint Sub-systems
It is important that once we trace down to the Hilbert
space HA factor, we potentially forgo any knowledge of
the ontic states of other disjoint sub-systems. Generally
working with the sub-space A is only good for asking
inclusive questions regarding the dynamics of ontic states
in a disjoint sub-system. In particular, as mentioned in
the last section, this means that ontic assignments for A
cannot generally be taken as global property assignments.
The only information we can have on disjoint sub-
systems A and B are the epistemic and ontic states of
the combined system A + B. The ontic states of the
latter will not generally be related to products of ontic
states of A and B: see figure 2. This means that it is not
A
|φa〉
E
S
|ψi〉
B
FIG. 2. Two disjoint systems A and B interacting with a
large environment E. Ontic states of A and B are |ψi〉 and
|φa〉, respectively, However, ontic states of A + B are not
generally equal to tensor products |ψi〉⊗|φa〉 and the ontology
is “quantum”.
generally consistent to make joint ontic assignments and
define joint probabilities to sub-systems A and B. How-
ever, in section IIIA, we will see that under suitable cir-
cumstances such joint assignment and probabilities can
emerge when A and B are macro-systems embedded in a
much larger environment.
In addition, as we saw in the last section, the ontic
state |ψi〉 of a sub-system A is precisely correlated with
the mirror ontic state |ψ˜i〉 of the E, the complement of A
in the sense that A+E is the total system. However, in
this case the pair of ontic states have no precise relation
to that of A+ E which is the pure state |Ψ〉 in (6).
C. Sub-systems and Effective Theories
Since each sub-system A ⊂ S enjoys its own set of on-
tic states and, if the latter are to represent a property
assignment, how are we to understand deformations in
the definition of the sub-system? This involves discrete
changes when we decide to move degrees-of-freedom from
the environment E to A, and vice-versa. The new inter-
pretation must explain how a recognisably stable classical
ontology can emerge out of the myriad of different pos-
sible sub-systems and their associated ontic states. Es-
sentially it does this by recognising that classical states
5are not directly identified with a particular ontic state
of a particular sub-system but rather to coarse grained
histories of ontic states and these are not sensitive to the
precise microscopic definition of A. We may change the
definition of A by moving microscopic degrees-of-freedom
into and out of A without affecting the collective be-
haviour of A that arises from coarse-grained time aver-
ages of a time sequence of ontic states. In fact, we will
see that for the sub-system A that is in equilibrium with
the environment E, its “classical state” is identified with
the ensemble or epistemic state ρˆA(t). The collective dy-
namics defined by the ensemble is expected to be stable
with respect to microscopic re-definitions of A.
Before we describe time dependence within the new
interpretation, it is important that we establish the lim-
itations of a particular quantum mechanical description
of a physical system. Many of the problems with exist-
ing modal interpretations result from making unrealistic
assumptions about the range of validity of the quantum
description. Analysing a quantum system involves identi-
fying an appropriate Hilbert space and Hamiltonian such
that the resulting dynamics is unitary. However, such
descriptions can only be approximately valid above some
particular length or time scale.7 Equivalently, using the
uncertainty principle, below a particular momentum or
energy scale. For instance, consider a scalar particle. At
low enough momenta, non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics is a good approximation and particle number is effec-
tively a conserved quantity so it make sense to write down
effective theories by taking a sector of the full Hilbert
space with one particle H1. Such a description, however,
will break down when the momentum increases and rel-
ativistic effects become important. This is governed by
a momentum scale mc, a length scale ~/mc (the Comp-
ton wavelength), an energy scale mc2 and a temporal
scale ~/mc2. In fact, non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics based on the one-particle sector leads to violations
of causality for measurements based on finite spatial re-
gions on the scale ~/mc. In that case, to recover a con-
sistent and causal description one must allow particles to
be created and destroyed and the effective theory in the
one-particle sector is no longer valid; one must instead
work with a much larger Hilbert space containing all-
particle sectors H0⊕H1⊕· · · in order to have a unitary
description. Of course, this is where quantum field the-
ory becomes the more appropriate formulation. At even
higher momenta, this description could break down, for
instance, if the particle were a composite. At some high
momentum scale the constituents would become impor-
tant and a different effective theory would be needed.
The message here is this that, when we analyse a typ-
ical quantum system, we are inevitably doing a low mo-
mentum (or low energy, large distance/time scale) ap-
proximation. In this effective description there is no sense
7 This point was made in [1] and elaborated in discussions with
Jacob Barandes [46].
in which the effective Hilbert space HA is a factor of the
total Hilbert space of the universe—assuming that the
latter even makes sense. In other words, it is not even
clear that A has a well-defined parent system in the sense
that HS = HA ⊗HE . However, in the spirit of effective
theory one can imagine that we can identify E with all
the degrees-of-freedom at the scale of the effective the-
ory that directly interact, or are entangled, with A. The
only requirement is that S is chosen to be large enough
in order to achieve an approximately unitary description
of the overall dynamics. For overall consistency, it is
important that the detailed nature of E, the so-called
“environment” or “bath”, is largely irrelevant for the be-
haviour of the sub-system A. This turns out to be the
case as long as dE ≫ dA. One could say that it is crucial
that the environment is present but that its details are
largely irrelevant, including the overall state of S, except
in very special situations where the initial state is very
non-generic. The latter occurs when a carefully designed
measuring device is interacting with a microscopic quan-
tum system.
Given that the analyses of quantum systems are
only effective descriptions valid above some particular
length/time scale, the so-called ultra-violet cut off, it is
important that that the new interpretation yields a for-
malism that that is not sensitive to phenomena on the
cut off scale. This does not means that the new inter-
pretation is not applicable to shorter distances or times,
but in order to be valid at more refined scales one would
need to apply it to the more fundamental effective theory
that takes over at this scale. The importance of this ob-
servation is that many of the problems suffered by other
modal interpretations result from issues that involve ar-
bitrarily short distance and time scales well beyond the
validity of the effective theory. The new interpretation,
on the contrary, is immune from these difficulties because
it acknowledges the inherent limitations of an effective
description. The fact that analyses of quantum systems
are only effective, means that there are intrinsic errors to
any calculation which involve powers of the characteristic
length/time scale to the length/time ultra-violet cut off.
D. Ontic Dynamics
If the issue of how to define ontic states at a given in-
stant of time is simple to state, the issue of how ontic
states change in time is a subject fraught with problems
for all modal interpretations. Our conclusion is that pre-
vious approaches are fundamentally flawed because they
make unrealistic expectations as to the limits of the va-
lidity of the analysis. They do not recognise the key fact,
discussed in the last section, that an analysis of a quan-
tum system is generally only an effective one and so is
valid only on distance and time scales that are greater
than some specific ultra-violet cut off. It is then perhaps
no surprise that problems arise when one tries to con-
struct a theory of ontic dynamics that is continuous in
6time.
A key principle, therefore, is that it only makes sense to
define ontic dynamics on a temporal coarse graining scale
that is the ultra-violet cut off scale η. So for a particle, for
instance, this would be η ∼ ~/mc2. As long as this scale
is smaller than any characteristic decoherence time scale
of the system under study then the effective description
is valid. We denote the
characteristic decoherence time scale = τ
Then the validity of the effective theory requires that
η ≪ τ . (7)
The scale τ will be defined more precisely later. The con-
dition (7) ensures that (i) the effective theory is a valid
description and (ii) the coarse graining appears smooth at
the scale of time-dependent phenomena of the system. To
summarise, our coarse graining scale lies at ultra-violet
cut off scale of the effective theory and for consistency of
the effective description, as long as (7) is satisfied and a
Markov condition respected, the whole formalism is then
insensitive to the exact value of η since the discretization
errors are of order η/τ . However, we cannot attempt to
take the cut off η → 0 and remain within the validity
of the effective theory. Note that even the dynamics of
the epistemic state governed by the Schro¨dinger equation
cannot be considered more fundamental because it is also
only an equation valid within the effective theory.
Since it is the interaction between A and E that is
responsible for the time dependence of the probabilities
pi(t), on the time scale τ , and the reason that the ontic
states |ψi(t)〉 do not satisfy the Schro¨dinger equation, the
fact that the coarse graining scale η ≪ τ means that over
a time step η the set of probabilities and ontic states do
not change much. The implication is that there exists a
unique one-to-one mapping between ontic states at time
t with those at t+η. We can use the freedom to permute
the labels of the ontic states at each time step to ensure
that the mapping associates |ψi(t)〉 with |ψi(t+η)〉 in the
sense that
〈ψj(t+ η)|ψi(t)〉 ∼ δij +O(η/τ) , (8)
in which case, the associated individual probabilities only
change by a small amount
pi(t+ η) ∼ pi(t)
(
1 +O(η/τ)) . (9)
It is important to emphasise that this continuity condi-
tion (8) is defined at the temporal scale η and we are
not at liberty to take the limit η → 0 since this would
go beyond the domain of applicability of the effective
theory. This is fortunate because it saves the new inter-
pretation from the scourge of macro-flips, a disease that
infects other modal interpretations. A macro-flip occurs
when the eigenvalues pi(t) and pj(t), for two macroscop-
ically distinct ontic states, try to cross. But generically
the eigenvalues “repel” each other and this leads to an
extremely rapid flip, over a time scale of order τ∆, of
the ontic state from |ψi〉 to the macroscopically distinct
state |ψj〉, or vice-versa. Given the importance of this
issue, we describe it more fully in section II E. Having
said that, apart from solving the problem of macro-flips,
having a small but finite cut off η will not affect the dy-
namics over the physically relevant time scale τ since the
discretisation errors involve powers of η/τ ≪ 1.
Given that the total system S = A+E is assumed to be
a pure state |Ψ(t)〉, the time dependence of the epistemic
state ρˆA(t) is determined by solving the Schro¨dinger
equation for S giving
ρˆA(t) = TrE
[
Uˆ(t, t0)|Ψ(t0)〉〈Ψ(t0)|Uˆ(t0, t)
]
. (10)
where Uˆ(t, t0) is the unitary time evolution operator in S.
We want to emphasize that it is really only meaningful to
describe this epistemic dynamics on the coarse graining
scale η.
The problem before us is to write down a similar dy-
namical equation for the probability that the system A
is in the ontic state |ψi(t + η)〉 given that it was in the
ontic state |ψj(t)〉:
pi|j(t) ≡ pi|j(t+ η, t) . (11)
These conditional probabilities, along with the Markov
property discussed below, define a stochastic process. In
order to be consistent with the probability constraint (5),
we must have
pi(t+ η) =
∑
j
pi|j(t)pj(t) , (12)
but this does not determine the stochastic process
uniquely so its definition is a hypothesis. However, we
will argue there are some additional natural constraints
which lead us to a unique process:
Markov: ontic states carry no memory of their previous
history and so the conditional probability to be in
the ontic state |ψi(t + η)〉 should only depends on
the ontic state |ψj(t)〉 and not on ontic states at
earlier times. This condition is fundamental to our
whole approach since it ensures that we can build
up the more coarse grained dynamics in terms of
the microscopic transitions (11) at the ultra-violet
scale η.
Locality: the stochastic process should be driven by the
local interaction between A and E and so in order
that it leads to a local form of dynamics we require
that it depends only on the initial and final ontic
states |ψj(t)〉 and |ψi(t + η)〉 of A and their ontic
mirrors |ψ˜j(t)〉 and |ψ˜i(t+ η)〉 of E as well as Hˆint
the part of the total Hamiltonian
Hˆ = HˆA ⊗ IE + IA ⊗ HˆE + Hˆint , (13)
7that describes the local coupling between A and
E.8
Ergodicity: generically we require that any state can
reach any other state in a finite number of steps.
However, this must break down for two macroscop-
ically distinct states |ψi〉 and |ψj〉, for which we
require that there should only be a minute prob-
ability of order ∆ (a typical inner product of two
macroscopically distinct states described in section
I) of a transition between them over a time scale τ .
As long as the stochastic process has these properties,
then its actual microscopic details are largely irrelevant
to the behaviour of macro-systems. The Markov prop-
erty is very natural given that in the new interpretation
the ontic state of a system is just a property assignment
at a particular time and has no memory of previous ontic
states. Moreover imposing this condition is fundamental
because it means that the ultra-violet dynamics pi|j(t)
determines the whole stochastic process since over a se-
ries of time steps tn = t + (n − 1)η, according to the
Markov property,
pjN |j1(tN , t1) =
∑
j2,...,jN−1
[
N−1∏
n=1
pjn+1|jn(tn)
]
. (14)
The resulting stochastic process is therefore a conceptu-
ally simple discrete-time Markov chain.
We now turn to the definition of the ultra-violet dy-
namics. A useful observation involves the matrix ele-
ments
Vij(t) =
(
pi(t+ η)pj(t)
)1/2
× Re 〈ψi(t+ η)| ⊗ 〈ψ˜i(t+ η)|Uˆ(t+ η, t)|ψj(t)〉 ⊗ |ψ˜j(t)〉 ,
(15)
where |ψ˜i〉 are mirror ontic states of E defined in (6) and
Uˆ(t+η, t) is the unitary time evolution operator in A+E.
Note that these matrix elements are completely symmet-
rical between A and E and the resulting dynamics will
consequently respect the exact correlation between their
ontic states. One finds from this definition and (6), that
pi(t+ η) =
∑
j
Vij(t) , pj(t) =
∑
i
Vij(t) , (16)
so it it tempting to relate
Vij(t)! pi|j(t)pj(t) . (17)
But we cannot have equality here, because the matrix el-
ements Vij(t) are not necessarily valued between 0 and 1.
8 Issues involving locality should properly be formulated in terms
of relativistic quantum field theory, so our notion here is more
primitive.
However, we can proceed as follows. If we have labelled
the states to be consist with the continuity condition (8),
it follows that since
pi(t+ η)− pi(t) =
∑
j
[
Vij(t)− Vji(t)
]
, (18)
the right-hand side must be small of order η/τ . We can
define the ultra-violet process by taking, for i 6= j,9
pi|j(t) =
1
pj(t)
max
[
Vij(t)− Vji(t), 0
]
(19)
and
pi|i(t) = 1−
∑
j 6=i
pj|i(t) . (20)
This process satisfies the probability constant (12).
It is important to realize that there is no guarantee
that the process defined above is consistent in the sense
that the conditional probabilities pi|j(t) are valued in the
interval [0, 1]. In fact, the consistency conditions are∑
j 6=i
pj|i(t) ≤ 1 , ∀i . (21)
As η → 0, the elements pi|j(t), i 6= j, can be made ar-
bitrarily small and so the process can always be made
consistent in this limit. Hence, there is an upper bound
on how big the cut off η can be taken. In order to inves-
tigate the this, we can interpret δpi for a single time step
as being due to a mismatch between the flows into and
out of the ith state, that is
δpi =
∑
j 6=i
pi|jpj −
∑
j 6=i
pj|ipi . (22)
The net flow out of the ith state involves the sum on the
left-hand side of (21). If we define the decoherence time
scale τ by
τ = η
[
sup
i
∑
j 6=i
pj|i
]−1
. (23)
So consistency of the process requires η ≪ τ . Note that
if η 6≪ τ then this does not imply a breakdown of the
formalism but rather a breakdown of the validity of the
effective theory: one should go to a more fundamental
effective theory valid at smaller distance/time scales.
Generically, both terms on the right-hand side of (22)
will be of the same order, so that
δpi ∼ O
(
piη/τ
)
. (24)
9 Using these expressions it is easy to see that the process defined
in (19) and (20) above agrees with the one defined in [1]: to
compare formulae the quantities p
(n)
ij in [1] are the conditional
probabilities pi|j(tn) here.
8However, later, we will describe the situation when A is
in equilibrium with the environment, in that case the pi
will be approximately constant on account of a balance
between the flows into and out of the states in (22). It
is important to notice that ontic states with very small
probabilities pj(t) do not give anomalously large values of
pi|j(t) as might be inferred from (19) because the factor
of pj(t) in the denominator is generally balanced by a
factor of a similar order in the numerator.
In the limit η ≪ τ , we can evaluate the matrix elements
(15) in perturbation theory:
Vij =
η
√
pipj
~
Im 〈ψi| ⊗ 〈ψ˜i|Hˆint|ψj〉 ⊗ |ψ˜j〉+ · · · . (25)
The fact that the matrix elements in (25) only depends
on the coupling Hˆint and the ontic states |ψi〉 and |ψj〉
and their mirrors |ψ˜i〉 and |ψ˜j〉 encapsulates the locality
requirement. Note that at this leading order Vij = −Vji.
In addition, the fact that the transition probabilities
depend on a matrix elements (25) involving the states
|ψi〉⊗ |ψ˜i〉 means that the stochastic process will be seen
to satisfy the ergodicity requirement. Essentially, if the
two states are macroscopically distinct states, then we
can expect pi|j(t) will be suppressed by a factor of order
∆ relative to the generic situation. The probability that
the system will make a transition between the ontic states
will therefore be vanishing small. In fact, over a time T
the chance that the system will make a transition from
one macroscopically distinct state to another would be
order T∆/τ . It is clear, given the crude estimate of ∆
in section I, we would have to wait of the order of e10
32
times the age of the universe to see such a transition.
It is worth emphasising that the ultra-violet dynam-
ics we have defined is not unique. The ambiguity corre-
sponds to changing
δpi|j =
Θij
pj
,
∑
i
Θij =
∑
j
Θij = 0 , (26)
subject to the constraint (21). However, there are no
obvious quantities Θij that could be defined that are at
the same time consistent with the ergodicity requirement.
We take the process that we have defined as being a hy-
pothesis on the same level as the Schro¨dinger equation
that determines the dynamics of epistemic state. How-
ever, it is possible to take an agnostic point-of-view and
avoid a concrete microscopic definition of the stochastic
process because:
As long as the ergodicity condition is satisfied, along
with the key probability relation (5), the microscopic
details of the stochastic process are actually irrele-
vant for reproducing standard Copenhagen interpre-
tation phenomenology of macro-systems which are in
equilibrium with their environment (as described in
section III B).
Finally, it is worth making clear the point that, al-
though we have introduced an auxiliary stochastic pro-
cess to define the dynamics of ontic states, this is com-
pletely different from dynamical collapse models dis-
cussed in the literature; for example in the review
[43]. The latter involve stochastic modifications of
Schro¨dinger’s equation itself, in other words they involve
introducing stochastic dynamics for the epistemic state
which is a completely different philosophy from the one
we are setting out here.
E. The Continuum Process and Macro-Flips
It is tempting, even though it runs counter to the
methodology of effective theory, to take the stochastic
process that we defined in the last section and take the
cut off η → 0, in order to define a continuum pro-
cess. However, typically one should expects pathologies
to arise when effective theories are pushed beyond their
range of validity. Indeed, in the present case, a pathology
manifests as the existence of micro-flips that represent a
severe problem for existing modal interpretations that
insist on following ontic states continuously in time. In
this section, we will describe how they arise and how the
new interpretation avoids them.
The ontic states of a sub-system |ψi(t)〉 are defined
continuously in time and so it is tempting to define ontic
dynamics that is also continuous in time. In fact, the
continuum limit of (18) takes the form
dpi
dt
=
∑
j
Jij , Jij = −Jji , (27)
with
Jij =
2
√
pipj
~
Im 〈ψi| ⊗ 〈ψ˜i|Hˆint|ψj〉 ⊗ |ψ˜j〉 , (28)
which is equal to the perturbative form of (Vij − Vji)/η
using (25). Written in this form, manifests the fact that
if A does not interact with E then Jij vanishes.
10 In that
case, a continuum Markov process can be defined whose
master equation takes the form
dpi
dt
=
∑
j 6=i
(
Tijpj − Tjipi
)
, (29)
corresponding to transitions into and out of |ψi〉. For
the stochastic process satisfying the ergodicity condition
10 Note that the expression for Jij seems to be missing a term
involving a time derivative compared with [1, 10]. However, it is
easy to see that, since ∂t(|ψj〉 ⊗ |ψ˜j〉) = ∂t|ψj〉 ⊗ |ψ˜j〉 + |ψj〉 ⊗
∂t|ψ˜j〉 and the sets of states {|ψj〉} and {|ψ˜j〉} are orthonormal,
this term actually vanishes. In addition, the total Hamiltonian
may be replaced by Hˆint for the same reason.
9defined in the last section
Tij =
1
pj
max (Jij , 0) . (30)
These are the transition probabilities originally suggested
by Bell [31] and further analysed in the context of modal
interpretations by Bacciagaluppi and Dickson [10]. This
is the continuum version of (19) obtained in the limit
η → 0.
Now we turn to the issue of macro-flips. The problem
of the continuous stochastic process above, occurs when
two eigenvalues of ρˆA(t), say p+(t) and p−(t), associated
to macroscopically distinct ontic states, try to cross as
illustrated in 3.
If the eigenvalues actually do cross then there is no
problem because then one can define the continuity of
the ontic states in time by imposing analyticity across
the point of degeneracy. This ensures that there are no
abrupt transitions between the two macroscopically dis-
tinct states. However, generically the eigenvalues will
not cross and, on the contrary, there will be a crossover.
In order to analyse what happens we can isolate the
important part of the reduced density matrix in the 2-
dimensional subspace spanned by the exactly orthogonal
macroscopically distinct states |φ±〉 roughly constant in
the neighbourhood of the degenerate point at t = 0:
ρsubspace ∼
(
p0 + a1t p0∆
p0∆ p0 + a2t
)
. (31)
Here, ai and p0 are real constants and we define a =
(a1 − a2)/2. Note that the ai will be of the order τ−1,
where τ is, as previously, a characteristic decoherence
scale. Here, ∆ is a measure of the typical inner-product
of two macroscopically distinct states. As described in
section I, for a typical macroscopic system we might have
∆ ∼ e−1032 . In the absence of the tiny inner product
between the macroscopically distinct states, i.e. when
∆ = 0, the ontic states (eigenvectors) are |ψi〉 = |φi〉
and the eigenvalues actually cross at t = 0. However,
when ∆ 6= 0 the eigenvalues are
p±(t) = p0 +
a1 + a2
2
t±
√
(at)2 + (p0∆)2 (32)
and the level crossing is avoided since, although the two
eigenvalues become close, they never actually cross. Near
the crossover, the eigenvectors are approximately
|ψ±(t)〉 = cos θ(t)|φ±〉 ± sin θ(t)|φ∓〉 , (33)
where
tan θ(t) =
at+
√
(at)2 + (p0∆)2
p0∆
, (34)
which goes from 0 to pi2 as t increases through the
crossover. The time for the crossover to occur is order
τ∆. This reveals the problem: by avoiding the degener-
acy the system exhibits an instability in the sense that
it flips between the macroscopically distinct states |φ+〉
and |φ−〉 in a very short time of order τ∆. This time
scale, for any system, will be much smaller than even
the Planck scale and therefore certainly much smaller
than the cut off scale η. So an interpretation based on
the continuous time stochastic process suffers from un-
acceptably rapid switching between macroscopically dis-
tinct states—a macro-flip—whenever probabilities try to
cross. Of course such macro-flips are completely unphys-
ical and one can only conclude that the continuous-time
stochastic process, pushing as it does beyond the domain
of applicability of the effective theory, is fundamentally
flawed.
|φ+〉
|φ−〉
|φ+〉
|φ−〉
∼ τe−10
32
t
FIG. 3. A crossover where there is an approximate degen-
eracy as p+(t) and p−(t) try to cross but ultimately “repel”
on a time scale of order τ∆. Any continuous-time stochas-
tic process will involve a rapid switching between macroscop-
ically distinct states |φ±〉—a macro-flip. On the contrary,
our coarse-grained stochastic process cannot “resolve” the
crossover and a macro-flip does not occur even though the
cut-off scale η is much smaller than any other characteristic
time scales in the problem: τ ≫ η ≫ τ∆.
On the contrary, our coarse-grained stochastic process
defined in section IID is immune from macro-flips. The
reason is that the crossover scale τ∆ ≪ η, even though
η ≪ τ , and so a crossover simply cannot be resolved
by the coarse-grained stochastic process. The smooth-
ness condition (8) then ensures that across the time step
that includes the crossover the ontic states are preserved
|ψi(t+η)〉 ≈ |ψi(t)〉 ≈ |φi〉, to order η/τ , and no dramatic
macro-flip of the ontic state occurs.
III. THE CLASSICAL LIMIT
A. Emergent Classicality
It is key feature of the new interpretation that what we
ordinarily understand as classical behaviour only emerges
in appropriate situations and is not put in by hand. The
fact that a successful phenomenology of macro-systems
arises rests largely on the fact that the stochastic process
defined in the last section satisfies the ergodicity condi-
tion.
10
More fundamentally, the new interpretation makes
statements about ontology that are precise but they are
not necessarily of a classical kind. For instance, as dis-
cussed in section II B, an interpretation based on reduced
density matrices cannot generally make joint property as-
signments to two disjoint systems A and B let alone as-
sociate probabilities to them. The only statements that
can be made involving both A and B are via the com-
bined system A+B and in this case its ontic states will
generally not be a tensor product of ontic states of the
sub-systems, i.e. |ψi〉 ⊗ |φa〉. The relation between on-
tic states of the three systems A, B and A + B will be
more fuzzy and potentially contradictory. One could say
that the fragments of reality cannot be drawn together
to form a consistent whole. We call this a “quantum”
ontology.
However, a familiar “classical” ontology can be an
emergent phenomenon in the following sense. Suppose
A and B are two disjoint weakly-interacting or causally
separated macro-systems in, or close to, equilibrium and
hence strongly entangled with the environment E with
dA, dB ≪ dE . We expect in these circumstances that the
ontic states of A+B will indeed approximately factorize
into a tensor product of the ontic states of A and B. The
mismatch will involve typically minute order ∆ effects:
|Φm(i,a)〉 = |ψi〉 ⊗ |φa〉+O(∆) , (35)
where m = m(i, a) is a 1-to-1 map. What this means
is the descriptions provided by A, B and A + B can be
integrated into a consistent whole, at least to high degree
of accuracy.
In this context, it is meaningful to make joint prop-
erty assignments for A and B and we can interpret, in an
emergent sense, the probability pm(i,a) as the joint prob-
ability for a pair of ontic states |ψi〉 and |φa〉 of A and
B:
p(i, a)
emergent
= pm(i,a) . (36)
It is the view from A + B that is needed to follow any
potential correlations between the ontic states of A and
B. Note also that the ontic states of A or B still cannot
generally be taken as global property assignments outside
of the triplet of sub-systems A, B and A+B.
The emergent joint probabilities satisfy the usual prob-
ability relations, but only to order ∆,∑
a
p(i, a) = pi +O(∆) ,
∑
i
p(i, a) = pa +O(∆) ,
(37)
although
∑
ia p(i, a) = 1.
In general, the ontic states of A and B can be corre-
lated in a classical (non-entangled) sense when ρˆA+B 6=
ρˆA ⊗ ρˆB meaning that
p(i, a) 6= pi pa . (38)
The case when A and B are not correlated corresponds
to when ρˆA+B = ρˆA ⊗ ρˆB and p(i, a) = pipa.
Note that we will meet an example in section V an
example where the ontic states of A+B are tensor prod-
uct states of A and B but the factors of one of them are
not the ontic states of the corresponding sub-system. So
simply being a tensor product state is not sufficient to
have a “classical” ontology.
The picture above of emergent joint ontic assignments
and joint probabilities can be generalized to many weakly
interacting or causally disconnected macro-systems A1+
· · · + An. An ontic state of the parent system will be,
to order ∆, a tensor product state |Φm(i(1),...,i(n))〉 =
|ψ(1)
i(1)
〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ(n)
i(n)
〉, and so emergent joint probabilities
can be defined of the form
p
(
i(1), . . . , i(n)
) emergent
= pm(i(1),...,i(n)) . (39)
The picture we have here is that the emergent classi-
cal world involves patching together very slightly differ-
ent descriptions—differing atO(∆)—of the same systems
from the point-of-view of Ai, Ai+Aj , Ai+Aj +Ak, etc.
For more microscopic systems this integration of ontic
states becomes more ambiguous and a classical descrip-
tion evaporates to be replaced by an ontology that is
truly quantum. We can quantify the degree of classical-
ity in terms of the generic scale ∆. So we can expect
systems to exhibit quantum fuzziness when ∆ is not so
small so that the relation between the ontic states be-
comes ambiguous and joint ontic assignments and joint
probabilities cannot be consistently defined.
B. Link with Statistical Mechanics
A key requirement of an interpretation of quantum
mechanics is to explain how the classical behaviour of
macroscopic systems emerges. Macro-systems with many
degrees-of-freedom are complicated systems whose collec-
tive behaviour is captured by the techniques of statistical
mechanics. It seems natural that any quantum origin of
classical behaviour must, at the very least, be able to give
a consistent foundation to classical statistical mechanics.
In fact, we might hope that such an understanding would
put classical statistical mechanics on a firmer conceptual
footing given that it is still, somewhat surprisingly, a con-
troversial subject. In particular, there is no consensus on
the role of probability, the meaning of entropy and the
relation of ensemble averages to time averages.
In the last few year a rather different and intrinsically
quantum approach to the subject has been developed
[23–30]. In this approach, ensembles arise at the quantum
level when a system A is entangled with a large thermal
bath, or environment, E. So the total system S = A+E
can be in a pure state but, nevertheless, the sub-system
A has a reduced density matrix that defines an ensemble
ρˆA. In this point-of-view, the thermodynamic entropy
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of A is precisely the entanglement entropy of the sub-
system S = −Tr(ρˆA log ρˆA) which is non-vanishing when
A is non-trivially entangled with the bath.
When the bath is much bigger than the system dE ≫
dA there are some very powerful principles that emerge.
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For almost any pure state of the total system in some
subspace HR ⊂ HS described by some global constraint
R (preserved under time evolution) the reduced density
matrix of the system A is approximately equal to
ρˆA ≈ TrEPˆR
dR
, (40)
where PˆR is the projection operator on the subspace
HR. If the global constraint is on the energy and the
interaction between the system A and the environment
E is sufficiently weak then it is straightforward to show
that ρˆA is approximately the canonical ensemble,
ρˆA ≈ e
−βHˆA
Z
, Z = TrA e
−βHˆA . (41)
However, it is important that the principle applies to
other possible constraints R on the total system, includ-
ing the absence of a constraint, and also to cases where
the interaction between the system and bath is not small.
The implications for statistical mechanics are evident.
If the total system starts out in almost any state in the
subspace HR, then the state of the sub-system A is ap-
proximately the state (40) independent of time. This
describes a situation where the system is in equilibrium
with its environment. In this analysis, the entropy be-
comes an objective property of the state of A caused by
entanglement with E.
More general questions involve situations when the
system starts off in a state which is not in equilibrium
[28, 29]. The results are summarised below:12
Equilibration: subject to some reasonable conditions,
every pure state of S is such that a small sub-
system A ⊂ S will equilibrate meaning that ρˆA(t)
approaches a limit which fluctuates about a con-
stant. Note that the initial state does not need to
be “typical”, in other words even though the over-
whelming number of states of S are such that A is
in equilibrium already, it is also true of initial states
where A is far from equilibrium. This includes ten-
sor product states |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉.
Bath independence: in the case that the initial state
is a tensor product |Ψ〉 = |ψ〉⊗ |φ〉, the equilibrium
state of A is independent of the state of the bath
|φ〉.
11 The following discussion here is taken mainly from Popescu,
Short and Winter [23] and Linden, Popescu, Short and Winter
[28, 29].
12 It is also possible to incorporate the constraint R on the system.
Sub-system independence: there are general condi-
tions under which the equilibrium state of A is in-
dependent of |ψ〉 the initial state of A. However,
there are also non-generic situations for which the
equilibrium state depends sensitively on |ψ〉.
It is clear that the focus on sub-systems means that this
re-formulation of statistical mechanics is closely related
with modal quantum mechanics. Moreover, the new in-
terpretation adds a new and important detail to the story
through the existence of the ontic state of the sub-system
A. This is analogous to the micro-state of classical sta-
tistical mechanics. However, it is important to point out
that its dynamics, described by the stochastic process de-
scribed in section IID, is conceptually simpler than the
dynamics of micro-states in classical statistical mechanics
because in the quantum case the number of ontic states
is always finite and the stochastic process is a simple
discrete-time Markov chain.
When the system A equilibrates, ρˆA(t) and its eigen-
values will fluctuate around a slowly varying quasi-
equilibrium and the underlying Markov chain becomes
approximately homogeneous : that is the transition ma-
trix pi|j(t) becomes time independent over time scales of
order τ . Of course, there may be much slower time de-
pendence for on scales≫ τ . The rate of flow into and out
of each ontic state in (22) approximately balances. Under
generic conditions, although the microscopic transitions
between a pair of states only go one way, over a finite
number n of time steps pi|j(t + nη, t) is a matrix whose
entries are all > 0 and hence the equilibrium process is
regular . The meaning of this is that any ontic state is
only a finite number of time steps away from any other
state. The fact that the process is a regular homogeneous
Markov chain implies that it is also ergodic and then it
is a standard result that
lim
n→∞
pi|j(t+ nη, t) = pi(t+ nη) , (42)
independent of j, and so, whatever the initial state, after
a large number of steps, the probability distribution is
equal to pi(t). More precisely, one can show that the
number of time steps must be at least order τ/η; in other
words, one must wait for a time of the order of τ , the
decoherence time defined by (23), for the memory of the
initial state to be lost:
equilibrium: pi|j(t+ τ, t) ≈ pi(t+ τ) (43)
This means that, in equilibrium, the actual ultra-violet
details of the stochastic process are hidden over time
scales of order τ , the decoherence time.13
13 As a simple example of an equilibrium process, suppose that at
equilibrium A is maximally entangled with E, so pi ≈ 1/dA .
If we define the process by taking one of each pair {pi|j , pj|i}
randomly and giving it the value p, while the other vanishes.
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In addition, ergodicity means that, in equilibrium, the
time average of a temporal sequence of ontic states over
a time scale of order τ is well approximated by the en-
semble average described by ρˆA(t). This gives us another
way to interpret the single-time probabilities pi(t): when
A has reached equilibrium with the bath, the single-time
probabilities pi(t) are approximately constant and are
equal to the probability that, in a suitably coarse-grained
time average, the system is in the ontic state |ψi(t)〉, in-
dependent of the initial state in the past. From the point-
of-view of the emergent classical view, the ontic state of
a macro-system in equilibrium is hidden and the proba-
bilities pi(t) can be given the ignorance interpretation:
When a system is in equilibrium with its en-
vironment, the ensemble associated to the—
approximately constant—reduced density matrix
ρˆA(t) captures the time average over the dynamics
of the ontic state. So we can associate the classi-
cal description of a macro-system with the collective
behaviour of the ensemble ρˆA(t).
It is noteworthy that the equilibrium state ρˆA(t) does
not depend on the details of the initial state of the bath,
however, the same cannot be said in all circumstances for
the initial state of A. In certain situations, discussed in
[28], the final equilibrium epistemic state of A can depend
very sensitively on the initial state. This is connected to
a breakdown of ergodicity of the stochastic process. We
can expect this to happen when the equilibrium state
of A has sets of ontic states which are macroscopically
distinct. In these conditions, the matrix elements Vij(t)
between states in different sets will be minute of order
η∆/τ . In this case, ergodicity of the stochastic process is
broken and once the system has equilibrated the resulting
time average of a temporal sequence of ontic states is
then only captured by a sub-ensemble of ρˆA(t). We could
summarise the situation by saying that:
In the new interpretation, both the correlata—
the ergodic subsets of states described by the sub-
ensembles—and the correlations, in the form of the
joint probabilities (36), are emergent quantities.
In this situation, the dynamics of the underlying ontic
state as described by the stochastic process is very sensi-
tive to the initial state of A. This is precisely what hap-
pens in a phase transition in a statistical system like the
Ising magnetic described in the introduction as the tem-
perature is lowered. But it also describes what happens
In this case, if one takes pi|j(t + T, t) − pi|k(t + T, t) for some
randomly chosen distinct i, j and k, then this approaches zero
as exp(−T/τ), with the time to approach equilibrium τ =
2η/(pdA), valid when τ ≫ η. On the other hand, the decoher-
ence time is defined in (23) as η
[∑
j 6=i pj|i
]−1
≈ 2η/(pdA) = τ
so this confirms that the equilibrium time is equal to the deco-
herence time.
in a quantum measurement where the measuring device is
designed to be very sensitive to the quantum state of the
system being measured. We will argue in §IV, that when
the measuring device equilibrates with the environment
there is a breaking of ergodicity of the underling Markov
chain such that each ergodic component corresponds to
a distinct measurement outcome. Collapse of the wave
function corresponds to a tidying up exercise in which one
removes the ergodic components that are not reachable
from the component that corresponds to the particular
measurement outcome that is realized, as illustrated in
figure 4.
ontic state
epistemic state ρˆA
t
sub-ensembles
ρˆ
(1)
A
ρˆ
(2)
A
FIG. 4. An illustration of the process of ergodicity breaking
during a measurement. Here, the set of of ontic states splits
into two distinct sub-ensembles between which the probabil-
ity of transition is vanishingly small. Two ontic histories are
shown that end up in different sub-ensembles after the mea-
surement.
IV. MEASUREMENTS AND THE COLLAPSE
OF THE WAVE FUNCTION
In this section we show how the new interpretation can
give a convincing account of the measurement process.
There are some benefits in starting with a simple model,
showing how it successfully describes certain aspects but
also how it has certain limitations. Then we introduce a
more sophisticated model which preserves the good fea-
tures and solves the problems. This shows that models
need to be realistic otherwise one can be led to misleading
conclusions. Along the way, we will need to use intuition
from the theory of decoherence, e.g. [16–22].
A. A Na¨ıve Model
The simplest set up involves an idealized von Neumann
measurement on a microscopic system. Let us suppose
the system P is some finite dimensional quantum system
with some basis states |ξi〉 that are eigenstates of the op-
erator associated to the observable we want to measure.
The system P is then coupled to a measuring device A
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through a Hamiltonian which acts as
Hˆ |ξi〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 = |ξi〉 ⊗ Hˆ(i)|ψ〉 , (44)
If the initial state of the combined system is taken to be
the non-entangled state
|Ψ(0)〉 =
[∑
i
ci|ξi〉
]
⊗ |ψ(0)〉 , (45)
then using the linearity of the Schro¨dinger Equation we
have
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i
ci|ξi〉 ⊗ |ψi(t)〉 , (46)
where |ψi(t)〉 is the state that evolves from |ψ(0)〉 via the
effective Hamiltonian Hˆ(i). In order for A to be effica-
cious, it must be that the states |ψi(t)〉 become macro-
scopically distinct after a macroscopic time T . This is
the process of decoherence [16–22]. We expect the in-
ner product of the states |ψi(t)〉 to exhibit a behaviour
roughly of the form∣∣〈ψi(t)|ψj(t)〉∣∣ ∼ exp [−NX(t)2/ℓ2] , (47)
for i 6= j, where X(t) describes how the distance between
the microscopic constituents of the measuring device be-
haves between the two measurement outcomes. We ex-
pect that this goes from 0 to the macroscopic scale L at
the end of the measurement at t = T , and so∣∣〈ψi(T )|ψj(T )〉∣∣ ∼ ∆ , i 6= j . (48)
We can estimate how fast decoherence occurs compared
with the macroscopic measuring time T by assuming that
X(t) is linear in t. As an example, by taking the same
values for N , ℓ and L as in section I, we find
τ
T
∼
ℓ
L
√
N
≤ e−16 . (49)
Now we apply the new interpretation to the model.
The reduced density matrix of the measuring device is
ρˆA(t) =
∑
i
|ci|2|ψi(t)〉〈ψi(t)| . (50)
We can now follow the ontic states in time as decoher-
ence occurs [1, 34]: see figure 5. In this case, one can
verify that only the transition probabilities p2|1(t), p3|1(t)
and p3|2(t) are non-vanishing and so the histories of ontic
states are rather simple as illustrated in figure 5. After
the measurement is complete t = T , the ontic states of
A are approximately equal to the |ψi(T )〉 up to terms
which are order ∆. But, as emphasised earlier, ∆ is so
much smaller than any other dimensionless scale in the
problem and in particular much smaller than the errors
intrinsic in the effective theory and so can safely be ig-
nored. Given that initially the measuring device has a
t
1
0
p1(t)
p2(t)
p3(t)
|ψ(0)〉
p
ro
b
a
b
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it
y
decoherence
|ψj(t)〉
macroscopically
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Tτ
FIG. 5. An example of how the probabilities pi(t) might be-
have for the case dP = 3. During the decoherence period
0 ≤ t ≤ τ , the states |ψi(t)〉 become macroscopically distinct
while the probabilities change in time. At the end of the mea-
surement at T ≫ τ , the eigenstates of the reduced density
matrix are approximately the states |ψi(T )〉 that occur with
probability pi(T ). Also show in bold is a hypothetic solution
of the stochastic process in this case with two transitions.
unique ontic state |ψ(0)〉, the corresponding probability
to be in the ontic state |ψi(T )〉 after the measurement is
pi(T ) = |ci|2 +O(∆) . (51)
So the new interpretation yields a satisfactory phe-
nomenology in this simplest measurement model and,
furthermore, yields the Born rule for the probabilities.
There are, however, problems with the model:
(i) When the initial microscopic system has a degen-
eracy |ci| = |cj | for some i 6= j. In the case of exact de-
generacy one can easily show that the associated eigen-
vectors of ρˆA(T ) after the measurement are no longer
|ψi(T )〉 and |ψj(T )〉, but rather involves the macroscopic
superpositions [34]
1√
2
(|ψi(T )〉 ± |ψj(T )〉) . (52)
There is a superficial answer to this problem which says
that a degeneracy of the state of P requires infinite fine
tuning that is unrealistic in practice [46]. Whilst this
is true, one can show that even when there is no exact
degeneracy the onset of decoherence can be delayed in
an artificial way by having nearly degenerate states. If
|c1|2 = 12 + e−s and |c2|2 = 12 − e−s then the decoherence
time is proportional to
√
s and so can be increased by
tuning close to the degenerate point.
(ii) The model does not satisfy our requirement that
the ontic states of macroscopic systems are robust against
microscopic re-definitions of the sub-system. In this case,
if we re-define A to include the microscopic system P
itself then the ontic state of A + P now becomes the
pure state of the total system (46) with probability 1. So
the slightly re-defined system, with the addition of one
microscopic degree-of-freedom, has led to a completely
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different ontology involving unacceptable superpositions
of macroscopically distinct states.
(iii) As it stands the model describes the case of a per-
fect measuring device that makes no errors. In realistic
situations one could imagine that A makes errors which
manifests by less than perfect correlation between the
states of P and A in (46). A more realistic situation has
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
i
fij(t)|ξi〉 ⊗ |ψj(t)〉 . (53)
with fij(t) → f (0)ij , a constant, after the measurement
time t = T . Now the reduced density matrix of the
measuring device is
ρˆA(T ) =
∑
ijk
f
(0)
ij f
(0)∗
ik |ψj(T )〉〈ψk(T )| (54)
and since the matrix f
(0)
ij need not be diagonal the ontic
states will involve superpositions of the macroscopically
distinct states |ψi(T )〉 [35].
B. A More Realistic Model
We now turn to a more sophisticated but realistic
model which solves all three problems above. The new
feature is that the measuring device is also interacting
with an environment E and so the complete system is
P +A+ E. The initial state of the system is
|Ψ(0)〉 =
[∑
i
ci|ξi〉
]
⊗ |Φ0(0)〉 . (55)
Here, |Φ0〉 is the initial state of the measuring device plus
the environment from which one deduces the reduced
density matrix of A by tracing out the environment:
ρˆA(0) = TrE |Φ0(0)〉〈Φ0(0)| , (56)
with eigenstates and eigenvalues
ρˆA(0)|ψa(0)〉 = pa(0)|ψa(0)〉 . (57)
We assume that the measuring device and environment
are in equilibrium and so in a highly entangled state.
In that case, the emergent classical view is ignorant of
the exact ontic state of A. At equilibrium, the stochas-
tic process described in section IID is ergodic and it is
the macroscopic time average of this process that corre-
sponds to what we think of as the initial classical state of
the measuring device and this is captured by performing
the ensemble average over ρˆA(0).
Evolving forward in time, and including measuring in-
efficiencies, we expect to have a state of the form
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
ij
fij(t)|ξi〉 ⊗ |Φj(t)〉 . (58)
After the decoherence time t > τ and so certainly at the
end of the measurement t = T , the states of A + B are
macroscopically distinct:∣∣〈Φi(T )|Φj(T )〉∣∣ ∼ ∆ , for i 6= j (59)
and fij(t)→ f (0)ij , a constant matrix. Note that unitarity
requires that the matrix f
(0)
ij satisfies∑
ij
∣∣f (0)ij ∣∣2 = 1 +O(∆) . (60)
The reduced density matrix of the measuring device plus
environment A+ E takes the form
ρˆA+E(T ) =
∑
ijk
f
(0)
ij f
(0)∗
ik |Φj〉〈Φk| , (61)
and so the ontic states of A+ E are∑
j
Z
(i)
j |Φj(T )〉+O(∆) , (62)
where the Z
(i)
j are eigenvectors of the matrix with ele-
ments:
Mjk =
∑
i
f
(0)
ij f
(0)∗
ik ,∑
j
MjkZ
(i)
k = λ
(i)Z
(i)
j .
(63)
So, unfortunately, the ontic states involve macroscopic
superpositions of states of A+E of the kind that we saw
in the simple measurement model in the last section.
However, if we examine the ontic states of A, which
is the physically relevant sub-system, a more satisfactory
picture emerges. Since the states of the environment are
to a high degree orthogonal for i 6= j, the reduced density
matrix for A takes the form
ρˆA(T ) =
∑
ij
∣∣f (0)ij ∣∣2ρˆ(j)A (T ) +O(∆) , (64)
where we have defined the component reduced density
matrices, one for each of the outcomes,
ρˆ
(j)
A (T ) = TrE |Φj(T )〉〈Φj(T )| . (65)
Since the states |Φi(T )〉 have such a small inner product
(59), the component density matrices commute to high
degree of accuracy
[ρˆ
(i)
A (T ), ρˆ
(j)
A (T )] = O(∆) . (66)
The ontic states |ψa(T )〉, the eigenvectors of ρˆA(T ), will,
therefore, split up into dP mutually ergodically inacces-
sible sets E(i), as well as a set E0 of approximately null
eigenvectors that play no important role. The component
density matrices take the form
ρˆ
(i)
A (T ) =
∑
a∈E(i)
p(i)a |ψa(T )〉〈ψa(T )|+O(∆) . (67)
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Therefore the ontic state |ψa(T )〉, a ∈ E(j), has ρˆA(T )
eigenvalue
pa(T ) =
∑
i
∣∣f (0)ij ∣∣2p(j)a +O(∆) . (68)
It does not involve a macroscopic superposition—at least
to order ∆—and so compared to (54), one can see that
the environment has the effect of yielding an acceptable
phenomenology.
Under the stochastic process, even for macroscopic
time scales, there is only a minute probability for |ψa(T )〉
to make a transition into another state |ψb(T )〉 in a dif-
ferent ergodic set a ∈ E(i) and b ∈ E(j), for i 6= j. For
fixed j, the group of ontic states |ψa(T )〉, a ∈ E(j), are
not macroscopically distinct, and so ontic states can ef-
fectively only make transitions within this set. We can,
in principle, use the stochastic process to work out the
probability pa|b(T, 0) that an initial ontic state |ψb(0)〉
evolves to |ψa(T )〉 using (14). However, according to our
discussion below equation (57), since the measuring de-
vice is assumed to be in equilibrium with the environment
its ontic states are undergoing constant transitions. The
time average of this process is captured by taking the en-
semble average over ρˆA(0). With this initial averaging,
we can use (14) to compute the probabilities that the
system is finally in the ontic state |ψa(T )〉:∑
b
pa|b(T, 0)pb(0) = pa(T ) . (69)
The result is simply the single-time probability in (68).
Turning to the final state, as far as the emergent classi-
cal ontology is concerned, the ontic states in an ergodic
set E(j) cannot be distinguished and are also undergo-
ing constant transitions between themselves. Therefore
it is only meaningful to compute the inclusive probability
that the system ends up in the jth set:
p(j)(T ) =
∑
a∈E(j)
pa(T ) =
∑
i
∣∣f (0)ij ∣∣2 +O(∆) , (70)
where we used the fact that Tr ρˆ
(j)
A = 1 so that∑
a∈E(j) p
(j)
a = 1 + O(∆). It is particularly notewor-
thy that the final result here is actually independent of
the detailed form of the microscopic stochastic process
that we introduced in section IID because we averaged
over the initial ontic state and the calculated an inclu-
sive probability for a sub-ensemble in the final state. The
non-trivial role of the stochastic process is that it was de-
fined in such a way so as to lead to ergodicity breaking.
Note that for a perfect measuring device fij(t) = ciδij
and so p(j)(T ) = |cj |2 which is just the Born rule.
Notice that, although the individual probabilities pa(t)
can depend on time as a result of the interaction of A
with the environment, the sum over the group is inde-
pendent of time to order ∆, assuming, as we have, that
the measuring device settles down and ceases to make
errors for t > T . It is clear that the more realistic model
solves problems (i) and (iii). Firstly, (iii) is solved be-
cause the ontic states |ψa(T )〉 do not involve macroscopic
superpositions. In addition, (i) is solved because the near
degeneracy |ci| ≈ |cj | no longer leads to macroscopic su-
perpositions or artificially extended de-coherence times.
Now we turn to problem (ii). The reduced density
matrix of A+ P is
ρˆA+P (T ) =
∑
ij
∣∣f (0)ij ∣∣2|Ξ(j)〉〈Ξ(j)| ⊗ ρˆ(j)A (T ) +O(∆) ,
(71)
where
|Ξ(j)〉 =
[∑
i
∣∣f (0)ij ∣∣2]−1/2∑
i
f
(0)
ij |ξi〉 (72)
and so the ontic states are
|Ξ(j)〉 ⊗ |ψa(T )〉+O(∆) , a ∈ E(j) . (73)
The probabilities are identical to (68). Note that the
ontic states (73) are those of A not entangled with states
of P . Hence, focussing on A+ P rather than A does not
lead to the disastrous change in the ontology seen in the
simple model. However, unless the measuring device is
perfect, the states |Ξ(j)〉 are not the ontic states of P ,
they are not even orthogonal.
C. Collapse of the Wave Function
After the measurement has been completed, the
stochastic process ensures that there are effectively no
transitions between the states in different ergodic sets.
As far as A is concerned, if the state |ψa(T )〉 has a ∈ E(j)
then for all practical purposes for calculating future dy-
namics, it would be prudent, but not necessary, to remove
the other terms i 6= j from A’s reduced density matrix
(64) leading to the replacement
ρˆA(T )  ρˆ
(j)
A (T ) . (74)
So the collapse of the wave function in the new interpre-
tation is just the innocuous process of removing terms
which could only have an effect of order ∆ in the future.
As we have repeatedly emphasised such effects are many
orders of magnitude smaller than other kinds of system-
atic errors that are inherent in the model. So if we con-
dition the future of a system on its present state—the er-
godic sub-ensemble of ontic states at a given time—then
collapse of the wave function is a harmless procedure of
removing terms that are ergodically inaccessible.
D. Measurement of Continuous Quantum Systems
Measurements on microscopic systems with continuous
eigenvectors, like the position of a particle, have caused
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problems for modal interpretations [37–39]. In this case
one might expect a generalization of (46) to be
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∫
dx ξ(x)|x〉 ⊗ |ψx(t)〉 . (75)
Here, |ψx(t)〉 is a macroscopic state of A indicating that
the particle is at x. The reduced density matrix of the
measuring device is then
ρˆA(t) =
∫
dx |ξ(x)|2|ψx(t)〉〈ψx(t)| . (76)
The potential problem is that even though the states
|ψx(t)〉 are expected to become approximately orthog-
onal, for instance, one expects∣∣〈ψx(T )|ψy(T )〉∣∣ ∼ exp [− λN(x − y)2] , (77)
the eigenvectors of ρˆA(T ), contrary to na¨ıve expectations,
are not localized in x. In fact, if the original wave func-
tion of the particle ξ(x) is spread out over a range δx
then the ontic states of the measuring device involve a
spread of the states |ψx(t)〉 over the same range. In other
words, the ontic states of A would involve macroscopic
superpositions. This is obviously a potential disaster for
any modal interpretation.
The loop-hole in this thinking was identified in [1].
In fact we should be on alert for any argument, like
that above, that relies on the smoothness of wave func-
tions down to be arbitrarily small scales as this is not
realistic and in the spirit of effective theory. In fact
non-relativistic quantum mechanics based on the one-
particle truncation of the multi-particle Hilbert space
breaks down on length scales ~/mc. So any attempt to
measure the position of the particle down to these scale
will inevitably involve particle creation and annihilation.
But in a more practical sense, any realistic description
would acknowledge the fact that A would have some in-
herent finite resolution scale. A simple way to model this
is to imagine that the states of A respond to the parti-
cle’s position in finite bins [xj , xj+1], where xj = x0+ jǫ,
where ǫ is the resolution scale. As along as ǫ ≫ ~/mc
the description of the measurement process within non-
relativistic quantum mechanics will be valid. In that case
(75) should be replaced by
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
j
∫ xj+1
xj
dx ξ(x)|x〉 ⊗ |ψj(t)〉 . (78)
After the measurement, the ontic states of A are ap-
proximately one of the discrete macroscopically distinct
states |ψj(t)〉 and so a satisfactory phenomenology with-
out macroscopic superpositions ensues.
In [1] a similar issue was shown to arise in an experi-
ment involving the monitoring of a decaying system. In
this case if the measuring device is taken to have infinite
temporal resolution then superpositions of macroscopi-
cally distinct states arise. However, once the finite tem-
poral resolution scale of a realistic measuring device is
taken into account the problem with macroscopic super-
positions evaporates.
V. EPR-BOHM AND BELL
In this section, we discuss the new interpretation in
the context of Bohm’s classic thought experiment [16,
40], based originally on the classic paper by Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen [41], and the implications for Bell’s
theorem [42].
It is useful for simplicity to avoid introducing a sep-
arate environment. Our experience from section IVA
suggests that we may do this as long as (i) we avoid de-
generacies in the state of microscopic system (ii) have
perfect measuring devices. The point is that the micro-
system acts as a surrogate environment for the measuring
devices and the ontic states of the measuring devices act
as proxies for the ergodic sets of ontic states of the more
realistic situation with a large environment.
A. The Thought Experiment
The EPR-Bohm set-up begins with a pair of qubits
initially prepared in the entangled state that we take to
be
|Φ〉 = c+|z+z−〉+ c−|z−z+〉 . (79)
Note that we assume that c± are generic to avoid degen-
eracies. The ontic states of 1 or 2 are each one of the pair
|z±〉 with probabilities |c±|2, or vice-versa, respectively.
BA
21
mn
FIG. 6. The EPR-Bohm thought experiment. Two qubits in
the entangled state |Φ〉 are produced at the source and then
recoil back-to-back towards 2 qubit detectors A and B de-
signed to measure the component of the spin along directions
n and m, respectively. In our set up, we choose an inertial
frame for which the interaction between A and 1 happens
before B and 2.
The ontic state of 1 + 2 is uniquely |Φ〉. Given our
discussion in section IIIA, we can say that the systems
1, 2 and 1+ 2 are related in a “quantum” way and there
is no notion of a joint property assignment or associated
probability for the ontic states of 1 and 2.
In order to perform measurements, we add two
spatially-separated spin detectors A and B, where A de-
tects the spin of particle 1 and B detects the spin of
particle 2 as in figure 6. The complete system consists of
qubits 1 and 2, measuring devices A and B and the en-
vironment, although as mentioned above in the present
context we will ignore the environment in this simplified
analysis. It is important that even though there is no
genuine environment, the ontic state of A + B is always
related to A and B in a classical way, that is as a tensor
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product of the ontic states of A and B as in (35) but in
this simplified model exactly. So the description from the
point-of-view of A, B and A+B can be integrated into a
consistent global description throughout the experiment.
Another important point is that the mirror ontic states
to those of A+B are the ontic states of 1+2 themselves
so that the ontic dynamics of A + B depends implicitly
on 1 + 2 as is clear from the matrix elements in (25).
Let us analyse what happens if A is set to measure
the spin component in the n direction, at an angle θ to
the z-axis in the (x, z) plane, and B is set to measure
the spin in a direction m at an angle φ to the z-axis in
the (x, z) plane.14 This set-up is generic enough for our
purposes.
The initial state of the overall system is
|Ψ(t1)〉 = |A0B0〉 ⊗ |Φ〉 . (80)
Suppose, in a certain inertial frame, the interaction be-
tween A and 1 happens first at time tA > t1. After a
short decoherence time, the state of 1 becomes entangled
with A and the state of the total system becomes for
t2 > tA
|Ψ(t2)〉 = |A+B0〉 ⊗ |n+ψ+〉+ |A−B0〉 ⊗ |n−ψ−〉 , (81)
where
|ψ±〉 = c± cos(θ/2)|z∓〉 ± c∓ sin(θ/2)|z±〉 . (82)
Note that these states are neither normalised or orthog-
onal.
Assuming in this simple model that the states |A±〉 are
exactly orthogonal, the ontic state of 1 + 2 has changed
from |Φ〉 to either of the non-entangled (and non-
normalized states) |n±ψ±〉 with probabilities 〈ψ±|ψ±〉.
The ontic state of 1 is now one of the pair |n±〉 and these
are now perfectly matched with the ontic states of 1+ 2.
The ontic states of 1 + 2, after the local interaction
between A and 1, are, of course, the analogues of the
collapsed wave functions of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion. So the puzzle seems to be that a local interaction
between A and 1 has changed the ontic state of 1 + 2
and this seems to have led to a non-local change of the
ontic state of qubit 2. But it turns out this is not cor-
rect. The key point point is that the interaction between
A and 1 changes the ontic states of 1 and 1 + 2 but not
2. To see this, the reduced density matrix of 2 before the
interaction between A and 1 is
ρˆ2(t1) = |c+|2|z−〉〈z−|+ |c−|2|z+〉〈z+| , (83)
while after the interaction,
ρˆ2(t2) = |ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ |ψ−〉〈ψ−| . (84)
14 The eigenstates are |n±〉 = cos(θ/2)|z±〉 ± sin(θ/2)|z∓〉 and
|m±〉 = cos(φ/2)|z±〉 ± sin(φ/2)|z∓〉.
But the states |ψ±〉 are neither normalized or orthogonal
and using (82) one can show that actually
ρˆ2(t1) ≡ ρˆ2(t2) , (85)
reflecting the fact that ontic assignments are local and
an interaction between A and 1 cannot affect the ontic
state of the causally separated qubit 2. The implication
is that the ontic state of qubit 2 remains one of the pair
|z±〉 throughout the interaction between A and qubit 1.
To be clear, the interaction between A and 1 does not
change the possible ontic states |z±〉 of 2 but also the
actual ontic state of 2. The latter fact follows from the
stochastic process describing the ontic states of 2 given
that the interaction Hamiltonian Hˆint is itself local, that
is of the form of a sum of two local interactions:
Hˆint = Hˆ
A,1
int + Hˆ
B,2
int , (86)
where the first (second) term is non-vanishing for t in the
neighbourhood of tA (tB). This implies
pz±|z±(t2, t1) = 1 . (87)
So although the interaction between A and 1 changes the
ontic state of 1 + 2 from |Φ〉 to one of the pair |n±ψ±〉
and this seems to have fundamentally changed the state
of 2, however, the ontic states of 1 + 2 cannot be broken
down in terms of the ontic states of its sub-systems 1
and 2—at least for t < tB. Consequently, there is an
apparent duality for qubit 2 from the point-of-view of
1 + 2 compared with 2:
2
1 + 2 |Φ〉 |niψi〉
|zk〉 |zk〉
tA
It is tempting to say that the behaviour of the state of
1 + 2 here is non-local. However, this is potentially mis-
leading because in order to talk about locality within the
system 1 + 2 requires us to break 1 + 2 down in terms
of its sub-systems 1 and 2. But, to reiterate, we cannot
break down the states |niψi〉 ontically in terms of 1 and
2 because the descriptions via 1 + 2 and 2 cannot be in-
tegrated into a consistent whole. We will have more to
say about this and its implications in section VB.
To emphasize, for t < tB, the ontic state of 1 + 2 is
not a tensor product of ontic states of 1 and 2 so there
is no sense in which the ontology is “classical” in the
sense described in section IIIA. So in figure 7, which
summarizes the ontic dynamics of 1, 2 and 1 + 2, we
label it as “quantum”.
On the other hand the behaviour of A+B, A and B is
always classical as illustrated in figure 8. The initial ontic
state of A+B is |A0B0〉 while after the measurement at
A the ontic state is then one of the pair |A±B0〉 with
probabilities
pA±B0|A0B0(t2, t1) = 〈ψ±|ψ±〉 , (88)
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FIG. 7. Snapshots of the ontic states of 1, 2 and 1+2 at times
t1 < tA < t2 < tB < t3 in the given inertial frame. For t = t1
and t2, the ontic states of 1+2 are not tensor products of the
ontic states of 1 and 2 and so the ontology is “quantum”. In
the last time step t = t3 the relation between states becomes
“classical” in the sense that the ontic states of 1+2 are tensor
products of those of 1 and 2.
for t1 < tA < t2. These follow from applying (5) along
with the uniqueness of the initial ontic state.
Finally, at time tB in this frame, B interacts with qubit
2 and after a further short decoherence time, the state
becomes
|Ψ(t3)〉 =
∑
ij=±
|AiBj〉 ⊗ |nimj〉〈mj |ψi〉 . (89)
After this interaction the triplet of systems 1, 2 and 1+2
now has “classical” ontology in the sense that the ontic
states of 1 + 2 are one of the quartet |nimj〉 and these
are tensor products of the ontic states of 1 and 2. For
the measuring devices, the final ontic states are one of
the quartet |AiBj〉. It is important is that (i) the first
interaction between A and 1 does not change the ontic
state of B and (ii) the second interaction between B and
2 does not change the ontic state of A. This is guaranteed
by the locality of the interaction Hamiltonian (86):
pB0|B0(t2, t1) = 1 , pAi|Aj (t3, t2) = δij . (90)
The implication is that the ontic dynamics has the tree-
like structure as shown in figure 8. Therefore, once again
using (5), the only non-vanishing probabilities are
pAiBj |AiB0(t3, t2) =
∣∣〈mj |ψi〉∣∣2
〈ψi|ψi〉 ,
(91)
for t2 < tB < t3. The final probabilities follow from (5),
or by composing (88) and (91),
pAiBj |A0B0(t3, t1) =
∣∣〈mj |ψi〉∣∣2 . (92)
As we have emphasised, the ontic states of A, B and
A+B are just tensor products of those of A and B for all
t. In the more realistic model with an environment, this
relation will be emergent as in (35). Given the classical
ontology, it is meaningful to define joint probabilities as
in (36):
p(AiBj)
emergent
= pAiBj |A0B0(t3, t1) . (93)
These emergent probabilities are exactly what would
have been predicted on the basis of Born’s rule. So dur-
ing the experiment the entanglement between 1 and 2 is
converted into an emergent classical correlation between
A and B. But what is crucial is that this correlation
arises after the local interaction between 1 and A and
separately between 2 and B and not through any non-
local interaction between A and B.
A |A0〉
|A+〉
|A−〉
|A+〉
|A−〉
B |B0〉 |B0〉
|B+〉
|B−〉
A+B |A0B0〉
|A+B0〉
|A−B0〉
|A+B+〉
|A+B−〉
|A−B+〉
|A−B−〉
tA tB
classical classical classical
FIG. 8. Snapshots of the ontic states of the measuring devices
A, B and A+B at t1, t2 and t3. The relation between the three
systems A, B and A+B is always classical, as the ontic states
of A+B are just tensor products of the ontic states of A with
those of B. However, for t = t3, the measuring devices are,
nevertheless, correlated in a classical sense because ρˆA+B 6=
ρˆA ⊗ ρˆB .
B. Bell’s Theorem
Now we turn to a discussion of Bell’s theorem [31, 42].
The first point is that, since the predictions agree with
the conventional analysis of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion and the Born rule, it must be that the new interpre-
tation implies a violation of the Bell inequality.
In fact it is easy to see that the new interpretation
violates outcome independence:
p(Bj |Ai, n,m) = p(Bj |n,m) . (94)
To see this note that the conditional probability above
can only be defined in the context of the ontic dynamics
of sub-system A+B; indeed,
p(Bj |Ai, n,m) ≡ pAiBj |AiB0(t3, t2)
=
∣∣〈mj |ψi〉∣∣2
〈ψi|ψi〉 .
(95)
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We can now pinpoint where the dependence on the state
of A arises in the interaction between B and 2. Although
the sub-system A + B can be broken down in terms of
its component parts A and B because their ontology is
aways “classical”, the ontic dynamics of A + B depends
on the mirror ontic state of 1+2, and 1+2 does not have
a “classical” ontology for t < tB. The relation between
the ontic states of A+B and the associated mirror ontic
states of 1 + 2 are as follows:
|A0B0〉 |AiB0〉 |AiBj〉
|Φ〉 |niψi〉 |nimj〉
! ! !
tA tB
It is the entanglement of the mirror ontic state |Φ〉 that
leads, after the first interaction at t = tA, to the mirror
ontic states |niψi〉. Including only the important tensor
product factors, we have
HˆA,1int
|A0〉 ⊗ |Φ〉 |Ai〉 ⊗ |ni〉 ⊗ |ψi〉
tA
It is important to remember that |ψi〉 are not the ontic
states of qubit 2 even though they are tensor product
factors of the ontic states of 1 + 2 for t = t2. This in
turn implies that when B interacts with qubit 2 at tB,
the ontic dynamics becomes implicitly dependent on the
ontic state of A through the mirror ontic state |niψi〉.
In this interaction, locality ensures that only the tensor
product factors of B and qubit 2 are relevant but the
state of A influences the dynamics via this initial tensor
product factor of qubit 2, that is |ψi〉, and this leads to
the Ai dependent probabilities (95):
HˆB,2int
|Ai〉 ⊗ |B0〉 ⊗ |ψi〉 |Ai〉 ⊗ |Bj〉 ⊗ |mj〉
tB
Note that during the interaction between B and qubit 2
the state of causally separated |Ai〉 is inert but is included
in the above to see the correlation with the states |ψi〉.
On the other hand, the probabilities satisfy parameter
independence:
p(A±|n,m) = p(A±|n) , (96)
since
p(A±|m,n) ≡
∑
j=±
pA±Bj |A0B0(t3, t1)
= |c±|2 cos2(θ/2) + |c∓|2 sin2(θ/2) ,
(97)
independent of m, i.e. φ. This latter condition expresses
the fact that what happens at A does not depend on what
is measured atB. The violation of outcome independence
but observance of parameter independence is just as in
the Copenhagen interpretation and a violation of either
implies a violation of the Bell inequality. So what we
have shown is that the new interpretation violates Bell’s
inequality for the same reason the Copenhagen interpre-
tation does because the initial state of the qubits |Φ〉 is
entangled. The novelty is that it does this without in-
voking the collapse of the wave function. Instead what
happens is a curious and apparently non-local change in
the ontic state of 1 + 2 from |Φ〉 to |niψi〉 when A and 1
interact. On closer inspection, though, it is hard to say
this is a non-local process because it does not make sense
to analyse the states |niψi〉 in terms of the ontic states
of their constituent qubits. So this is the “spooky action
at a distance” of quantum mechanics laid bare. In any
event there is no violation of causality.
Another point to make is that the assignment of on-
tic states clearly depends on the inertial frame chosen to
view the experiment. For instance in our chosen frame,
where the measurement is made at A before B, the ontic
states of A+B after the first measurement are |A±B0〉.
But in another frame, where the measurement is made
at B before A, the ontic states of A + B after the first
measurement are |A0B±〉. This, of course, is no surprise,
but modal interpretations have been claimed to be in-
consistent with special relativity [44]. Fortunately these
claims have shown to rest on the false assumption that
the ontic states of a sub-system are global property as-
signments and so are unwarranted [12].
VI. DISCUSSION
The emergent Copenhagen interpretation is a com-
pletely self-contained interpretation of the quantum me-
chanics that builds on and modifies earlier proposals that
are collectively known as modal interpretations. The key
ingredient is the fact that one cannot isolate a quan-
tum system from its environment. The interaction be-
tween the two allows one to define the dual notion of the
epistemic and ontic state of the sub-system. The for-
mer evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation (for
the total system), whilst the latter evolves according to
a stochastic process. This dualism is analogous to the
ensemble and micro-state of classical statistical mechan-
ics and allows for the solution of the measurement prob-
lem by invoking an ergodicity argument familiar from the
discussion of a phase transition. Although we have pre-
sented the quantum interpretation as an analogue of clas-
sical statistical mechanics, in fact the former should be
taken as a proper definition of the latter. In this regard,
we are taking the viewpoint of [23–30] but reintroducing
the notion of a micro-state in the form of the ontic state.
However, unlike the situation of micro-states and ergod-
icity in classical statistical mechanics, the dynamics of
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ontic states follows from a very simple Markov process.
The most striking feature of the interpretation is that it
reproduces the phenomenology of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation for macro-systems and the collapse of the wave
function is just an innocuous process of removing ergod-
ically inaccessible parts of the epistemic state. However,
there is no sharp Heisenberg cut between microscopic sys-
tems and macroscopic systems. One can quantify the
degree of classicality as the time required to see a transi-
tion between two hypothetically macroscopically distinct
states; as order τ/∆, where ∆ is the magnitude of the
inner product of the two states. A shortened description
of new interpretation will appear in [45].
Finally, we can put Schro¨dinger’s cat out of it misery.
According to the new interpretation, it is either alive or
dead but these states are not pure states rather they are
associated to ergodic subsets of ontic states that are, for
all physically relevant time scales, mutually inaccessable.
So the cat may be either alive or dead but in either case
in equilibrium with—hence strongly entangled with—the
environment.
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